Abstract. Tough anti-terrorism policies are often defended by focusing on a …xed minority of the population who prefer violent outcomes, and arguing that toughness reduces the risk of terrorism from this group. This reasoning implicitly assumes that tough policies do not increase the group of 'potential terrorists', i.e., of people with violent preferences. Preferences and their level of violence are treated as stable, exogenously …xed features. To avoid this unrealistic assumption, I formulate a model in which policies can 'brutalise'or 'appease' someone's personality, i.e., his preferences. This follows the endogenous preferences approach, popular elsewhere in political science and economics. I formally decompose the e¤ect of toughness into a (desirable) deterrence e¤ect and an (undesirable) provocation e¤ect. Whether toughness is overall e¢ cient depends on which e¤ect overweighs. I show that neglecting provocation typically leads to toughness exaggeration. This suggests that some tough anti-terrorism policies observable in the present and past can be explained by a neglect of provocation.
Introduction
The public debate on terrorism policies is dominated by two goals: protecting society against existing terrorists, and preventing the emergence of new terrorists. The …rst goal initially suggests a tough policy of …ghting terrorists and deterring them by severe punishments. But, while toughness might often be successful with respect to the …rst goal, it can undermine the second goal by provoking individuals who were previously peaceful. The heart of the disagreement over the correct anti-terrorism policy, in politics and society, is that proponents of toughness usually refer to the …rst goal, whereas critics of toughness usually refer to the second goal. Awareness for the other goal is often lacking in each camp. While the public debate stays informal, it is important to formally analyse the two-edged e¤ect of toughness. This has to happen in a single model since we need to understand the interaction and trade-o¤ between the two e¤ects. But does there exist any compelling model of two phenomena as di¤erent as deterrence and provocation? Many increasingly re…ned gametheoretic treatments, for instance, are quite successful in capturing deterrence e¤ects, but (with few exceptions) neglect provocation: they assume that the risk of terrorism comes from a …xed group of individuals with stable violent preferences and hence optimize the policy with respect to these individuals only, neglecting potential provocation of other individuals who are not included as players in the model. This theoretical paper proposes a new model that captures both (desirable) deterrence and (undesirable) provocation by anti-terrorism policies. The model construes provocation as a form of preference change. It considers a large group of individuals (possibly the entire world population and notably all potentially provocable individuals) and treats as endogenous whether and how much someone likes violent outcomes: These preferences react to the anti-terrorism policy, re ‡ecting that policies may create or reduce hate and other human feelings, particularly if these feelings are directed towards the policy makers themselves or the countries or cultures associated with them. Some policies might 'brutalise' preferences, others might 'appease'them.
In this model, policies can deter and provoke, and these two opposed policy e¤ects can be quanti…ed and weighed against each other. This allows one to conceptualise and compare the two opposed aspects of toughness (deterrence and provocation) and thereby places the popular disagreement over the e¤ec-tiveness of toughness on formal grounds. To avoid distractions from our focus (on the two-edged e¤ect of toughness), the model is kept abstract and simple on all other dimensions, emphasising mathematical generality while sacri…cing concreteness and speci…city. I avoid any ad hoc technical restrictions (e.g., to utility functions from a particular parametric class) or interpretational restrictions (e.g., to particular kinds of terrorism or toughness).
I prove that, under regularity conditions, the policy's e¤ect on aggregate terrorism is the sum of its deterrence e¤ect and its provocation e¤ect, and, further, that under plausible (but not universal) conditions the deterrence effect is negative (i.e., terrorism-reducing) and the provocation e¤ect positive (i.e., terrorism-increasing). So, the policy maker e¤ectively faces a trade-o¤ between deterrence and provocation. I also compare provocation-aware with provocation-neglecting policies and prove that provocation-neglect quite gener-ally leads to toughness exaggeration. The paper's analysis invites comparisons with contemporary and past antiterrorism policies, including the question of how much these policies have provoked (in the paper's technical sense) and whether their choice was driven by provocation-neglect. Such comparisons with reality are left to the reader's imagination and to empirical follow-up work. Being non-empirical, the present paper refrains from concrete empirical claims.
The paper is organised into an informal part (Section 2) that introduces many key ideas, and a formal part (Section 3) that provides the mathematical foundations. In Appendix A, an application is worked out. In Appendix B, all proofs are given.
Although provocation by anti-terrorism policies is discussed in political science and sociology (and by people on the streets), formal rational-choice-based models usually ignore it (some exceptions are mentioned below). In focussing on provocation and modelling it as a form of preference/taste change, I take the approach of the literature on endogenous preferences. The instability of tastes and their endogenous determination by environmental factors such as governmental policies or institutions is increasingly recognised and modelled in economics (e.g., Polak 1976 , Hansson 1995 , Becker 1996 , Bowles 1998 , Rabin 1998 , Dekel et al. 2007 , Dietrich 2012 . It is important to incorporate this approach into terrorism modelling, because dispositions towards terrorism seem particularly unstable and environment-sensitive in that they typically re ‡ect complex mental states rather than basic biological attributes or needs.
Provocation as modelled here (that is: a policy-caused development of preferences for violent outcomes) can be interpreted either as a rational taste change, derived from stable extended preferences over extended alternatives that contain the policy as a taste parameter, or as a dynamically inconsistent taste change. The …rst interpretation allows one to explain provocation by a stable preference to reciprocate, i.e. to harm tough policy makers (countries, cultures etc.) and to be mild to soft ones. The rational-choice foundations of reciprocal feelings are understood increasingly well (e.g., Rabin 1993 , Fehr and Gächter 1998 , Bolton and Ockenfels 2000 , Sethi and Somanathan 2001 , Dufwenberg Kirchsteiger 2004 and Falk and Fischbacher 2006 . The second, no less important interpretation of provocation, namely dynamic inconsistency, stresses the e¤ect that anti-terrorism policies can have on someone's personality and psychological state. This results in a change in fundamental preferences (e.g., Strotz 1955 -56, Hammond 1976 , O'Donoghue and Rabin 1999 , Bénabou and Pycia 2002 . One might defend such an interpretation of provocation against one in terms of stable reciprocal preferences by arguing that terrorists were usually not born with the (conditional) preference to perform terrorist attacks in future conditional on such and such future circumstances; radical preferences are usually created over time by circumstances (e.g., by a war) rather than being always present as conditional preferences, so the argument.
By standing in the tradition of the endogenous preference literature, this paper is less related to existing work on terrorism prevention in political economy. One branch of this …eld is empirical and investigates potential causes of terrorism; e.g., Eubank and Weinberg (1994) , Silke (1994) , and Dumas (2002) . A more theoretic (often game-theoretic) branch assesses the e¢ ciency of various anti-terrorism measures by accounting for costs and/or various strategic incentives of terrorists and governments. Some important contributions are Kilgour (1985, 1987) , Cio¢ -Revilla (1985 , Lichbach (1987) , Zagare and Kilgour (2000) (with the perhaps most prominent theory of interstate deterrence), Frey and Luechinger (2002) , Frey (2004) , Enders and Sandler (2006) , Goodin (2006) . Part of this literature emphasizes limitations of deterrence and toughness, yet not on grounds of resulting provocation (in our sense), but for instance on grounds of non-credibility of certain threats or on grounds of costs. A few game-theoretic contributions do however account for provocation in their own ways; in particular, Brams and Kilgour (1988) , Rosendor¤ and Sandler (2004) and Bueno de Mesquita (2005) study models in which harsh governmental policies may increase the motivation of, or the support for, or the mobilisation of terrorists. Overall, the empirical and theoretical literature provides several important insights not reviewed here; future research might combine them with the insights on provocation e¤ects developed here.
Informal analysis
Throughout the paper we consider a policy maker (e.g. a national government or international organisation) in charge of choosing and implementing an antiterrorism policy. The term 'anti-terrorism policy'is understood in a broad sense (made precise in Sections 2.2 and 2.3), possibly including measures as di¤erent as the creation of social institutions, changes in the education system, military interventions, police presence, criminal legislation and jurisdiction, declarations and speeches by politicians, diplomatic relations, embargoes, and so on.
The terrorism threat comes from the members of a (…nite non-empty) set of individuals N , called the population. Crucially, N contains not just individuals currently engaged in terrorist activities (arguably a frequent mistake) but also all potential ones. This speaks for a large de…nition of N : it might include all humans on earth, or some group de…ned geographically, ethnically, religiously, or else. The term 'individual'always refers to members of N .
In response to the policy, each individual engages in some behaviour, which can be more or less violent; he 1 might exercise no violence at all, or perform small o¤ences, or major terrorist attacks, and so on. I assume that an individual cares about two consequences of his behaviour: (i) a level of damage created, represented by a real number x 0, and (ii) a level of punishment received, represented by another real number y 0. The term 'punishment'is used very broadly: it stands for any personal disadvantage ('cost') incurred, such as having to hide from authorities (before or after damage creation), having to prepare the attack, coming to prison afterwards, and so on. Usually, most individuals behave so as to obtain the no-damage-no-punishment outcome (x; y) = (0; 0). I use the term 'terrorist' resp. 'non-terrorist' in a technical sense to denote someone who causes positive damage x > 0 resp. zero damage x = 0 (without intending any further connotations that this sensitive terminology may have in normal language). Although I say throughout that someone 'chooses' his damage-punishment pair (x; y), this pair is in fact the outcome not just of own behaviour but also of the policy: damage x could depend on the level of protection of targets, and punishment y on criminal legislation. (In practice, the outcome (x; y) often also depends on chance, since the exact level of damage x created by behaviour under a policy is often subject to uncertainties, as is the level of punishment y, which might depend on whether the terrorist is captured and how lucky he is in his trial. Our framework can capture 'chance' if one re-interprets (x; y) as an expected-damage-expected-punishment pair.
2 )
Peaceful vs. brutal preferences
Suppose a given policy is in action. As usual, individuals are preferencemaximisers. Accordingly, let each individual i in the population N hold some 1 Throughout I use masculine pronouns, without intended gender restriction. 2 To make our analysis compatible with this re-interpretation, one would need two technical assumptions: (i) an individual's behaviour leads to a (discrete or continuous) probability distribution (lottery) over damage-punishment pairs with a …nite expectation in each coordinate; (ii) the individual ranks such lotteries based on their expectation pairs. Condition (ii) is restrictive, since it implies risk-neutrality: the agent must for instance be indi¤erent between achieving (x; y) = (2; 2) for sure and achieving (2; 0) or (2; 4) with equal probabilities. Condition (ii) holds if the agent maximizes the expectation of a linear utility function u(x; y) = ax + by (for constants a; b 2 R), but is violated for non-linear utility functions such as that given by u(x; y) = p x + p y and that given by u(x; y) = xy.
preference order 3 = i on the set R 2 + = [0; 1) [0; 1) = f(x; y) : x 0; y 0g (damage-punishment quadrant) of damage-punishment pairs (x; y); the associated relations of strict preference and indi¤erence are de…ned as usual. 4 As illustrated in Figure 1 , some individuals might hold peaceful preferences, others brutal ones. Formally, I call a preference order (on the damage-punishment quadrant R 2 + ) peaceful if less damage is preferred to more ceteris paribus, i.e. if (x; y) (x 0 ; y) whenever x < x 0 , and brutal otherwise. in c r e a s in g p r e f e r e n c e a n in d if f. c u rv e a peaceful preference a brutal preference with satiable desire for damage a brutal preference with insatiable desire for damage increasing preference in c r e a s in g p r e f e r e n c e a n in d iff .
cu rv e Someone's preference -whether peaceful or brutal -is usually punishmentaverse, where I call a preference order (on the damage-punishment quadrant R 2 + ) punishment-averse if less punishment is preferred to more ceteris paribus, i.e. if (x; y) (x; y 0 ) whenever y < y 0 .
Given punishment-aversion (which I assume throughout the informal discussion), the di¤erence between peaceful and brutal preferences shows in the slope of indi¤erence curves: peaceful preferences have negatively sloped indi¤erence curves (…rst plot in Figure 1 ), whereas brutal preferences have positively sloped indi¤erence curves at least somewhere on the quadrant R 2 + (second and third plot in Figure 1) . By anti-clockwise rotating the indi¤erence curves, preference becomes more brutal, where I have in a natural way (partially) ordered the preference orders on R 2 + in terms of brutality: is at least as brutal (or at most peaceful) as 0 if any preference for higher damage that holds under 0 also holds under , i.e. if (x; y) 0 (x 0 ; y 0 ) and x > x 0 imply (x; y) (x 0 ; y 0 ).
3 Throughout, 'preference order'refers to a transitive and complete binary relation. 4 For all (x; y); (x 0 ; y 0 ) 2 R 2 + , we have (x; y) (x 0 ; y 0 ) , [(x; y) (x 0 ; y 0 ) and not (x 0 ; y 0 ) (x; y)], and (x; y) (x 0 ; y 0 ) , [(x; y) (x 0 ; y 0 ) and (x 0 ; y 0 ) (x; y)].
In this sense, the preference on the right of Figure 1 is more brutal than that in the middle, which is more brutal than that on the left. A radical form of brutal preferences are ones with insatiable damage desire, i.e. (x; y) (x 0 ; y) whenever x > x 0 , in which case indi¤erence curves are positively sloped on the entire quadrant R 2 +
(third plot in Figure 1 ). (One might speculate whether some suicide bombers have insatiable damage desire.) The more moderate forms of brutal preferences are ones with a strictly positive but …nite optimal damage level x (which might depend on punishment y), where preference typically decreases as damage x moves away from the optimum in either direction holding y …xed (see second plot in Figure 1 ). For instance, someone might desire to destroy a building, but preferably without killing humans.
Each anti-terrorism policy results in some (non-empty) set F R 2 + of feasible damage-punishment pairs from which individuals have to 'choose'. Figure 2 and later …gures take the feasible set F to be 'thin' and linear and to render every damage level x 0 feasible (nothing of which is essential 5 ), with the plausible feature that punishment increases with damage and that no-damageno-punishment (0; 0) is feasible. behave under the policy (all maximising preference): the peaceful type on the left creates no damage (is not a terrorist), the strongly brutal type on the right creates positive damage (is a terrorist), and the moderately brutal type in the middle creates no damage (but would have been a terrorist under only slightly more brutal preferences).
Cause-related and symptom-related policy measures
A policy measure can qualify as part of the anti-terrorism policy if, through whatever means, it a¤ects the damage level created by individuals. Someone's damage level x is determined by two factors: (i) his preference order on the damage-punishment quadrant R 2 + and (ii) the feasible set F R 2 + from which he chooses. This naturally leads me to distinguish between two sorts of anti-terrorism policy measures, to be labelled 'cause-related' or 'symptomrelated'(without the derogative connotation that the term 'symptom-related' sometimes has in natural language):
A cause-related or appeasement measure aims at changing the preferences of population members, not the constraints F R 2 + under which they can create terrorism. The goal is that brutal preferences become peaceful (as on the right in Figure 3 ) or at least less brutal (as on the left in Figure  3 ). The question as to which measures succeed in appeasing preferences is bound to be context-dependent and controversial: Should one focus on improving education? or on raising the standard of living? or on reducing polarisation? or on inducing sympathy (say using advertisements) with those persons, cultures or institutions against which terrorism might be directed? or on reducing media attention from terrorism to render the latter less desirable, as Bruno Frey (2004) advocates? and so on. There is mixed evidence on how such measures a¤ect a di¤erent but related variable, terrorism itself (rather than preferences); for instance, Krueger and Malecková (2003) cast doubts on the e¢ ciency of raising education and lowering poverty. A symptom-related or deterrence measure aims to reduce terrorism by changing the constraints F R 2 + under which terrorists operate (possibly with brutalising side e¤ects on people's preferences, as analysed in the next subsection). Roughly, such measures render the feasible set F 'steeper', and perhaps render some damage levels x infeasible. 6 Such measures can be defensive or aggressive. Defensive measures change the di¢ culty of creating damages x, for instance by erecting weapons embargoes, protecting buildings, supervising public places, enforcing transparency in bank transfers, or decentralising society to make it less vulnerable as Bruno Frey (2004) proposes. Aggressive measures change the kind or extent of punishment y, for instance by severe legislation, a worldwide search for terrorists, or a war. While there may be overlaps, the di¤erence between defensive and aggressive deterrence can be formalised (see Section 4). A related distinction in the literature is that between 'proactive'and 'defensive'measures (e.g., Rosendor¤ and Sandler, 2004) .
Symptom-related measures and the problem of provocation (side) e¤ects
The rest of the paper (except Appendix A) analyses symptom-related policy measures as just de…ned. As Figure 4 illustrates, additional toughness does not lead to more terrorism if people's preferences are guaranteed to be nonprovocable, i.e. policy-invariant. However, as Figure 5 illustrates, symptom- preference for or against exercising violence is not stable but reacts to the environment: some environments appease, others brutalise tastes and desires. The anti-terrorism policy may form part of the environment that shapes someone's personality and preferences. A policy may let someone develop hate feelings and a preference for creating damage, either in order to hurt the policy-makers themselves (if the hate feelings focus on them) or without a speci…c target (if the hate feelings are more di¤use). Such provocation is given two interpretations in Section 2.4, namely in terms of either dynamic inconsistency or extended preferences over damage-punishment-policy triples (the latter interpretation offering two perfectly rational explanations of provocation: reciprocity and taste acquisition).
This said, an individual's preference order on the damage-punishment quadrant R 2 + should be indexed by the policy t, say t with t ranging over a set T of relevant (symptom-related) policies among which the status quo policy t. Here, t represents the individual's (more or less peaceful) dispositions under (the impression of) policy t. I call an individual, or the family of his policy-indexed preference orders ( t ) t2T on R 2 + , unprovocable if preference t is the same for each policy t 2 T ; provocable otherwise. 7 This de…nition of provocability leaves open the direction of the preference reaction. In principle, provocation could even take the inverse form that tough policies appease preferences (such as when someone becomes unable to touch a knife after the traumatic experience of a war); this psychological reaction, later referred to as 'inverse provocation', is possible but seems less frequent.
If one were to decompose someone's preferences into a damage-related utility and a punishment-related utility, say, through an additively separable utility model u t (x; y) = v t (x) + w t (y) as in Appendix A, then one is led to ask: does provocability come rather from damage utility v t (x) being policy-sensitive, or rather from punishment utility w t (y) being policy-sensitive? Certainly, utility derived from terrorism v t (x) seems more likely to be policy-sensitive: while the pain from a …xed punishment level y seems policy-invariant, the pleasure of creating a …xed damage x highly depends on how much the person dislikes the policy makers (cultures, etc.) he hurts, which may be policy-sensitive.
How does a policy toughening a¤ect terrorism? As illustrated in Figure 4 , the behaviour of unprovocable individuals is a¤ected in a desirable way: nonterrorists stay non-terrorists, and terrorists reduce damage, possibly becoming non-terrorists. Such deterrence without provocation is extensively studied in the crime and terrorism literature, using di¤erent models. For provocable types, the picture changes and becomes less uniform. Damage increases for types where provocation outweighs deterrence (…rst two plots of Figure 5 ), but decreases for types where deterrence outweighs provocation (third plot in Figure 5 ). In Figure 6: Deterrence e¤ect and porvocation e¤ect 6, I decompose the total e¤ect of the toughness rise on a terrorist's damage into a (usually negative) deterrence e¤ect, representing the damage change if, hypothetically, preferences were to remain constant, and a (usually positive) provocation e¤ect, caused by preference change.
There is no general rule as to which of these two competing e¤ects is stronger; for the type on the left (right) in Figure 6 , provocation (deterrence) is stronger. The same decomposition also works for non-terrorists: the deterrence e¤ect is then zero (less than 'no damage'doesn't exist) but the provocation e¤ect might be positive, turning the person into a terrorist.
I shall be formal in Section 3 about the decomposition into deterrence and provocation. But qualitatively, what can we learn already now? If the population is approximately homogeneous, the policy maker can reduce terrorism by adjusting the policy to the predominant type; for instance, high toughness is e¢ cient against a population dominated by types that are unprovocable (see Figure 4 ) or little provocable (see right plots in Figures 5 and 6 ). Often though, the population is signi…cantly heterogeneous and contains many types (preferences), some more provocable than others, some peaceful and others brutal in the status quo. Then the policy maker faces the di¢ cult task of …nding the right compromise given the type distribution. As a rule of thumb, optimal toughness is decreasing as a function of the level of provocability and increasing as a function of the level of (status quo) brutality in the type distribution. More precisely, a policy shift from the status quo t to some new policy t 2 T minimises sum-total terrorism, as given by the sum x = X i2N x i of damage levels x i across individuals i 2 N , if and only if it minimises the policy's aggregate e¤ect on damage (i.e. the change of x from the status quo). This e¤ect can be decomposed into the sum DE(t) + PE(t) of the aggregate deterrence e¤ect DE(t) and the aggregate provocation e¤ect PE(t).
8 DE(t) and PE(t) measure how much policy t a¤ects terrorism through deterrence and provocation, respectively. In practice, the policy maker faces two distinct challenges:
Finding the right level of toughness. Suppose the policy maker decides on a single policy parameter (e.g. the size of a military intervention), so that we can identify policies with toughness levels t chosen from a one-dimensional policy space T R. As Figure 7 illustrates, in trying to minimise the function 0 costincluding optimum toughness t 
is individual i's deterrence e¤ect, de…ned as his change of damage holding his preferences …xed, i.e. neglecting provocation. Similarly, PE(t) is the sum of the individual provocation e¤ects P E i (t), i 2 N .
DE(t) + PE(t)
, the policy maker faces a standard one-dimensional trade-o¤ because DE(t) is decreasing but PE(t) increasing in toughness t (for details, see Section 3). A minimum of DE(t) + PE(t) de…nes an optimum on the trade-o¤ between deterrence and provocation. Overshooting toughness increases terrorism by provoking too much, and undershooting toughness increases terrorism by deterring too little. As also illustrated in Figure 7 , a re…ned objective function might be DE(t) + PE(t) + Cost(t), where Cost(t) represents the (suitably scaled) cost of toughness t (such as …nancial costs, loss of human lives, and loss of life quality through state supervision). As Cost(t) typically increases in toughness t, the optimum is typically reached at lower toughness than under the cost-neglecting objective function DE(t) + PE(t). In short, toughness t should be the lower, the steeper the PE(t) curve is (more provocability), the ‡atter the DE(t) curve is (less deterrability), and the steeper the cost curve Cost(t) is (more costly toughness).
Finding the right kind of toughness. Suppose now that a policy t is given by many policy parameters: criminal legislation, weapons embargoes, police presence, military interventions, and so on. This may be represented by a multidimensional policy space T . 9 Interestingly, the same level of deterrence -i.e. the same set F of feasible damage-punishment pairs, hence the same deterrence e¤ect DE(t) -is often achievable by several policies t 2 T that di¤er in their dimension-speci…c toughness levels and thereby provoke in di¤erent ways and to di¤erent overall extents PE(t): some of these policies may lead to peaceful preferences on R 2 + for most individuals, others to many brutal preferences. On which dimensions should the policy be tough, on which mild? Our model recommends a policy that achieve its overall level of deterrence in the least provoking way, which is implemented by allocating toughness to dimensions where deterrence comes with little provocation. The reason is that di¤erent policies t with same aggregate deterrence e¤ect DE(t) can be compared based just on their aggregate provocation e¤ect PE(t) (possibly plus policy costs Cost(t)). For instance, if introducing a weapons embargo leaves most individuals'preferences either totally unchanged (as in Figure 3 ) or brutalises them just slightly in the sense that deterrence overweighs provocation (as in the right plots of Figures 5 and 6 ), then this toughness raise is desirable, and preferable to other ones that deter equally but provoke more. 10 Whether overall deterrence should be high (i.e. F should be 'steep') is context-dependent. 9 That is, T R k , where a policy is seen as a vector t = (t 1 ; :::; t k ), and t 1 is the level of toughness of 1 st kind, t 2 that of 2 nd kind, and so on. 10 The embargo does indeed deter: the feasible set F R 2 + gets 'steeper'because damage creation gets harder (if feasible at all) and more criminal (so more highly punished).
Provocable preferences: a case of rationality or of dynamic inconsistency?
What can make someone's preference over damage-punishment pairs react to the policy (e.g. to a war)? I deliberately leave the paper's analysis compatible with two classical economic interpretations of preference change: dynamic inconsistency, and what I call rational taste change in deference to Gary Becker's terminology.
Rational taste change: reciprocity and acquired tastes. Under this interpretation, an individual's policy-dependent preference orders t , t 2 T , (on the damage-punishment quadrant R 2 + ) are derived from a single stable extended preference order~ over the set R
+
T of damage-punishment-policy triples (x; y; t), in which t plays the role of a taste parameter: for each t 2 T , (x; y) t (x 0 ; y 0 ) then simply means that (x; y; t)~ (x 0 ; y 0 ; t), i.e. that the individual prefers having (x; y) with policy t to having (x 0 ; y 0 ) with policy t (just as someone might prefer white to red wine with desert, though perhaps not with cheese). Such extended preferences can rationalise provocation, in at least two ways. First, there may be a desire to reciprocate, i.e. to be violent to tough policy makers (foreigners, etc.) and peaceful to mild ones. Second, the ability to enjoy terrorism may be acquired, namely through experiencing the policy, e.g. a war (just as a consumer à la Becker acquires the ability to enjoy a good by building up a stock of social and personal capital); note that taste acquisition does not imply dynamic inconsistency (just as the Becker consumer is not dynamically inconsistent: he anticipates his future abilities). The indi¤erence curves of t (plotted in our …gures) are derived from the higher-dimensional indi¤erence sets of~ (in the space R 2 + T ) by …xing the 'third coordinate't, i.e. by intersecting with the subspace R 2 + ftg.
Dynamic inconsistency. A dynamically inconsistent agent disapproves of his own future preference: he undergoes a personality change under the impression of the changing environment (policy), and his preference change is not representable by stable extended preferences (or stable intertemporal preferences over complete event streams). To illustrate, suppose the policy changes from the status quo 'mild'( t) to 'tough'(t). How would someone whose preference changes from 'peaceful'( t ) to 'brutal'( t ) describe himself before the change?
In the earlier case of rational taste change, he might say: "I want and will always want to harm tough foreigners and to be kind to mild ones, and so I am currently not a terrorist but intend to become one whenever the foreigners becomes tough."
In the case of dynamic inconsistency, he might say: "I am currently a paci…st who does not want to harm any mild or tough foreigners, and I wish I could prevent that, once foreigners become tough, my personality changes and I develop a desire to harm them."
More formally, the person's present preference about his future damagepunishment under future policy t are given by: present taste t in the case of dynamic inconsistency; future taste t in the case of rational taste change; some combination of t and t in mixed cases.
Empirically, the di¤erence between these kinds of preference change is revealed in commitment behaviour. 11 In economics, dynamic inconsistency is often associated with individuals whose mental state is subjected to chocks or in ‡uences, either of an external kind (brutal friends, war) or an internal kind (Alzheimer, puberty). In this sense, provocation seems a natural candidate for dynamic inconsistency. Which explanation of provocation, then, is appropriate? Answers are likely to be both context-dependent and controversial; the reader might choose his or her preferred explanation. It might even be that (within the same application) some individuals undergo a rational taste change and others a dynamic inconsistency. It is thus important that our model of provocation is not committed to one interpretation only.
The origin of provocation matters in at least two ways. First, it may determine the manner in which provocability should be empirically measured or tested. Second, it becomes behaviourally relevant in extensions of our model. Why so? The present model can leave the question open essentially because each individual gets to choose only once a damage-punishment pair, namely after the new policy is implemented, and so only his then-preference matters for behaviour, regardless of how it came about. However, in an extended model of repeated interaction between policy maker and population, the origin of provocation a¤ects individual strategies, hence optimal policies to prevent terrorism.
The fallacy of neglecting provocation
Provocation e¤ects of policies are easy to overlook in practice, for systematic reasons given in a moment. Probably they are being overlooked or underestimated in contemporary anti-terrorism politics, but this is an empirical claim that this theoretical paper cannot defend. Rather, let me brie ‡y discuss (i) consequences of and (ii) explanations for provocation-neglect.
Consequence of provocation-neglect: toughness exaggeration. (The rigorous treatment comes in Section 3.4.) A provocation-neglecting policy maker minimises the wrong objective function since he wrongly predicts people's response to the policy. He assumes people keep their old (status quo) preferences under the new policy: peacefully minded persons stay peacefully minded, brutally minded persons stay equally brutally minded. This leads the provocationneglecting policy maker to minimise DE(t) + Cost(t) rather than DE(t) + PE(t) + Cost(t), where, as in Section 2.3, DE(t), PE(t) and Cost(t) denote the aggregate deterrence e¤ect, the aggregate provocation e¤ect, and the cost of policy t 2 T , respectively. Since PE(t) is an increasing function of toughness Figure 8 : An example in which provocation-neglect leads to a toughness raise, but provocation-awareness to a toughness reduction (see Theorem 1 below), the provocation-neglecting policy maker is tougher than would be optimal, as Figure 8 illustrates in the case of a one-dimensional policy choice problem. Such toughness exaggeration due to provocation-neglect may be called the 'fallacy of neglecting provocation'.
Explaining provocation-neglect. Is provocation-neglect an elementary mistake that cannot be expected to occur among policy makers? On the contrary, provocation-neglect may be a tempting error, almost like a trap wide open in front the policy maker who can avoid it only by particular serenity. The reason is that people's provocability may be little visible before the new policy (e.g. before a war): it is not (yet) revealed in behaviour, perhaps not even in speech, especially if provocation comes from dynamic inconsistency (see Section 2.4). In a relatively mild status quo environment, individuals who would develop brutal preferences if the policy were toughened may display perfectly sane and harmless behaviour, and even declare the peacefulness of their intensions. It certainly takes special serenity and psychological and cultural sensitivity to foresee if and how a policy would provoke those subgroups who so far behave peacefully and whose (dynamically inconsistent) members are perhaps even themselves unaware of being provocable.
Do there exist indirect ways to nevertheless 'observe'or 'test'beforehand if and how people would be provoked by new policies? In now brie ‡y address this question.
First, consider speech-revelation: can one trust someone's speech about what he would desire or do under such and such new policy? Speech-revealed preferences, which many economists legitimately treat with caution, may be particularly unreliable here, for two reasons:
A person might not sincerely reveal the brutality of his future preferences or actions, by fear of the consequences of making his criminal side known. We are dealing here with revealing not the present preference order (over damage-punishment pairs), but future preferences held under potential new policies. Revealing these is in principle possible, and might be realistic under the reciprocity interpretation because then the future desires already exist presently in the form of conditional preferences. But the plausibility of revealing future preferences decreases if these preferences arise by dynamic inconsistency (or by rationally acquired tastes): the person might then not be aware that a new environment would turn him into a terrorist, also given that this drastic event would presumably be unprecedented in his life.
Second, while speech-revelation is thus limited as a tool to 'measure'provocability, certain past observations may serve as proxis to estimate provocability. Similar policies might in the past have been used in similar contexts and on similar populations (though many culture-and context-speci…c factors would have to be controlled for). Also, the population might in the past have displayed certain (more or less violent) behavioural patterns in response to environments (such as more or less rough social environments) that, though not identical to the policy-induced environments, resemble them. In the best case scenario, past data allow one to statistically estimate, for each policy t 2 T , the population's resulting distribution of preferences t .
Formal analysis
The above informal analysis draws on some claims, in particular about the signs of two competing e¤ects of toughness on terrorism: the provocation e¤ect is typically non-negative, the deterrence e¤ect typically non-positive. But what means 'typically'? I take this question up now by giving su¢ cient conditions for these claims to hold. A social welfare analysis of toughness will also con…rm the earlier claim that provocation-neglect leads to toughness exaggeration.
To draw a comparison …rst, Slutsky's fundamental equation of demand theory decomposes the e¤ect of a price increase on demand into two conceptually distinct e¤ects, the income e¤ect and a substitution e¤ect. We pursue a similar goal in decomposing the e¤ect of toughness on terrorism (damage) into two conceptually distinct e¤ects, deterrence and provocation. In spite of obvious di¤erences, our approach shares some key aspects with Slutsky's: (i) The primary level of description is the individual: the e¤ect of a price/toughness raise on overall demand/terrorism is obtained by aggregating the e¤ect on individual demand/terrorism. Accordingly, much of this section focusses on a single individual, with the understanding that one could later aggregate.
(ii) The e¤ect of a price/toughness change can be analysed either by comparing the status quo price/toughness with a …xed new price/toughness, as done in textbook discussions of Slutsky's decomposition and in Section 2, or by considering a marginal price/toughness change, i.e. by di¤erentiating demand/terrorism with respect to price/toughness, as done in Slutsky's equation and in this section.
(iii) Each sube¤ect has a typical sign, yet there are exceptions, such as income e¤ects getting positive for inferior goods and provocation e¤ects getting negative for inversely provocable individuals.
(iv) The two sube¤ects are constructed by means of a thought experiment involving hypothetical behaviour: the substitution (resp. deterrence) e¤ect represents how a price (resp. toughness) change would a¤ect demand (resp. terrorism) if, hypothetically, the individual's achieved utility level (resp. his preference order ) did not change.
Framework, terminology, notation
Throughout we consider the following sequence of events. First the policy maker chooses a policy t from a given set T of possible policies, among which the status quo policy t. Each policy t 2 T leads to a set F t R 2 + of feasible damage-punishment pairs (x; y). Under the environment of policy t 2 T , each individual i in the (…nite non-empty) population N holds some (complete and transitive) preference order t;i on the damage-punishment quadrant R 2 + that guides his behaviour, i.e. his choice of a damage-punishment pair (x; y) from the feasible set F t . I call the policy maker provocation-aware (resp. -neglecting) if he believes that any policy t 2 T gives any individual i the true preferences i;t (resp. the status quo preference i; t ).
In spite of what the …gures in Section 2 might suggest, feasible sets F t need neither be linear, nor be 'thin', nor render all damage levels x 2 R + feasible. In general, each feasible set has two by-products: the feasible damage set and the punishment function, de…ned and denoted as follows. Policy t's feasible damage set X t R + is de…ned as X t := fx : (x; y) 2 F t for some y 2 R + g (the projection of F t on the x-coordinate), representing what damage is physically possible under policy t. If X t = R + , any damage can be created. If X t ( R + , the policy physically limits the kind or extent of damage people can create, for instance by weapons embargoes or police presence or airport controls, which make major terrorist attacks simply impossible to create, thus leaving only the more 'modest'targets for terrorists. Typically, the feasible damage set X t contains at least x = 0 ('no damage'is feasible) and forms an interval, which could be unbounded (X t = R + ) or bounded (X t = [0; x t ] or X t = [0; x t ) where x t is a feasibility bound established by policy t). Policy t's punishment function f t : X t ! R + maps every feasible damage level x 2 X t to the minimally received punishment, i.e. f t (x) := inffy : (x; y) 2 F t g. The graph of the function f t represents the southern border of the feasible set F t . An important example are feasible sets of the ('thin') form
consisting of pairs of a feasible damage x 2 X t and a unique punishment f t (x); here each feasible set F t is 'thin'in that it coincides with the graph of f t .
Typically, a policy t's punishment function f t is increasing: higher punishment for higher damage. Intuitively, the tougher the policy t, the higher the punishments f t (x); x 2 X t , and also the fewer the feasible damage levels, i.e. the smaller X t . However, it is perfectly possible for two policies in T that one gives higher punishment yet renders more damage levels feasible, or that one gives more punishment for some damage levels but less for others; then these two policies cannot easily be ranked in terms of their toughness or deterrence.
In practice, individuals often have many ways to produce a given damage x 0 (e.g. many ways to kill someone), and punishment might depend on the chosen way. Feasible sets do then not take the 'thin'form (1) but the general form F t = f(x; y) 2 R 2 + : y 2 Y t (x)g; t 2 T , where, for each policy t 2 T and each damage level x 0, Y t (x) is a set Y t (x) R + of punishment levels that can occur in combination with damage level x. In fact, feasible sets F t ; t 2 T , can always be written in the latter form; in the 'thin'case (1), each set Y t (x) is singleton (if x is feasible) or empty (if x is infeasible).
Marginal provocation e¤ect and deterrence e¤ect
In the rest of Section 3 (but not in Appendix A), the policy maker chooses a single policy parameter representing the toughness level. More precisely:
Unidimensional Policy Space UP. The set of policies T is an interval T R (of toughness levels), and the status quo t 2 T is non-extremal, i.e. not on the boundary of the interval T .
We consider an individual whose preferences t , t 2 T , are regular as de…ned by three conditions:
R1 (punishment-aversion) For every policy t 2 T , t is punishment-averse, i.e. (x; y) t (x; y 0 ) whenever y < y 0 .
R2 (continuity) For every policy t 2 T , t is continuous, hence is (by Debreu's
Theorem) representable by a continuous utility function u t : R 2 + ! R. R3 (unique optimum) For all policies t 1 ; t 2 2 T , there exists a unique damagepunishment pair, denoted (x(t 1 ; t 2 ); y(t 1 ; t 2 )), that maximises t 1 within F t 2 (i.e. that is an optimal response to policy t 2 under the preferences of policy t 1 ), and moreover the damage level x(t 1 ; t 2 ) is a di¤erentiable function of (t 1 ; t 2 ) 2 T T .
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The optimisation problem in R3 is hypothetical in that under policy t 2 the individual really maximises t 2 , not t 1 ; but if we set t 1 = t 2 = t, we obtain precisely the individual's real optimisation problem under policy t. Hence, R3 in particular implies that to each policy t 2 T the individual has a unique optimal response, to be denoted (x(t); y(y)) (= (x(t; t); y(t; t))).
So we can de…ne the marginal e¤ect of raising toughness from the status quo t:
The (marginal) e¤ect (of toughness) is de…ned as E := x 0 ( t), the derivative (at the status quo) of damage with respect to toughness. Figure 9 : The old, the new, and the two hypothetical damage levels in Figure 9 , the key is to …rst introduce two hypothetical behaviours, one that neglects provocation and one that neglects deterrence:
The pure-deterrence or provocation-neglecting response to policy t 2 T , denoted (x deter (t); y deter (t)), is de…ned as (x( t; t); y( t; t)), the choice that maximises the old preference t within the new feasible set F t . It captures deterrence without provocation, as it represents how the individual would react to the new policy if (hypothetically) his preferences were to remain unchanged. It represents how a provocation-neglecting policy maker predicts the individual's response to policy t. The pure-provocation or deterrence-neglecting response to policy t 2 T , denoted (x prov (t); y prov (t)), is de…ned as (x(t; t); y(t; t)), the choice that maximises the new preference t within the old feasible set F t . It captures provocation without deterrence, by representing how the individual would react to the new policy t if (hypothetically) he did not yet face the new constraints (such as new punishment levels). Under another interpretation, it represents the individual's reaction if, although his preferences are already a¤ected (perhaps provoked) by the new environment, he is short-sighted or irrational in that he ignores the new punishment levels he faces.
The pure-deterrence damage x deter (t) and pure-provocation damage x prov (t) represent two partial views on the person's damage response to policy t: x deter (t) is optimal under old preferences given new punishment levels, and x prov (t) is optimal under new preferences supposing old punishment levels. I can now de…ne deterrence and provocation e¤ects.
The (marginal) deterrence e¤ect (of toughness) is de…ned as DE := x 0 deter ( t), the derivative (taken at the status quo t = t) of the pure-deterrence damage x deter (t). It captures the marginal damage change as far as it is caused by changing constraints (punishments), ignoring any meanwhile preferences change. The (marginal) provocation e¤ect (of toughness) is de…ned as P E := x 0 prov ( t), the derivative (taken at the status quo t = t) of the pureprovocation damage x prov (t). It captures the marginal damage change as far it is caused by preference change, ignoring the changing constraints (punishments).
Theorem
I now show that the total e¤ect of toughness is decomposable into E = P E+DE with P E 0 and DE 0. While the additive decomposition E = P E + DE is simple to prove (essentially, by applying the chain rule), the claim on the signs of the sube¤ects is non-trivial and does not hold universally, but under meaningful conditions. Speci…cally, each inequality, P E 0 and DE 0, is based on exactly one condition on preferences. The condition for P E 0 excludes that raising toughness appeases the preference; more precisely:
Condition NIP (no inverse provocability) If the individual is currently indi¤erent between two damage-punishment pairs, then a toughness raise cannot make him prefer the pair with lower damage. That is, whenever (x; y) t (x 0 ; y 0 ) with x < x 0 , then no policy t 2 T with t > t leads to (x; y) t (x 0 ; y 0 ).
NIP is plausible -it is less demanding than requiring that t be at least as brutal as t (see Section 2.1) whenever t > t -but not universal: surely, there also exist inversely provocable individuals, such as ones who after the traumatic experience of a war lose any desire to exercise violence themselves. For such individuals, the provocation e¤ect P E can become negative.
As the deterrence e¤ect DE is (unlike P E) de…ned by holding preferences …xed, the inequality DE 0 has to be based on a condition quite di¤erent to NIP: not a condition about how preference changes as the policy changes, but one about internal consistency of status quo preference:
Condition TC (translation-consistency) Under the status quo preferences, a preference of one damage-punishment pair over another with higher punishment is not reversed by any symmetric punishment increase. That is, whenever (x; y) t (x 0 ; y 0 ) with y < y 0 , then for no > 0 there is (x; y + ) t (x 0 ; y 0 + ).
By TC, an extra amount of punishment cannot hurt less if it comes on top of more punishment; for instance, an extra hour of compulsory labour cannot hurt less if it comes on top of 10 hours than if it comes on top of 5 hours. TC is again plausible but not universal, and its failure can render the deterrence e¤ect DE positive.
Unlike the de…nition of P E, that of DE is based on varying the feasible set F t , and so the sign of DE cannot possibly be independent of how F t reacts to the policy t 2 T . This is why the inequality DE 0 requires an extra condition on feasible sets, one that relates the shape of F t to the toughness level t 2 T . Speci…cally, I require that the tougher the policy t 2 T is, the 'steeper' the feasible set F t becomes, i.e. the larger marginal punishment becomes:
Condition MP (marginal punishment increases with toughness) Each feasible set F t , t 2 T , contains the no-damage-no-punishment pair (0; 0), it is (topologically) closed and connected, and its marginal punishment function f 0 t : X t ! R is de…ned 14 , non-negative, and (at least weakly) increasing in toughness t 15 .
Essentially, MP requires the southern border of the feasible set F t (i.e. the graph of f t ) to have a non-negative slope that increases if toughness t increases. In the special case that each feasible set F t is 'thin'(i.e. identical to its southern border: F t = f(x; f t (x)) : x 2 X t g), MP simply requires feasible sets to everywhere have a non-negative slope that increases with toughness. MP holds for instance if T = (0; 1) and each F t has southern border of the linear form f t (x) = tx (so f 0 t (x) = t), or more generally, the form f t (x) = tx c for a …xed c > 0 (so f 0 t (x) = ctx c 1 ), because f 0 t is then non-negative and increasing in t.
Theorem 1 Consider the unidimensional policy choice problem UP. Then, for every individual whose preferences are regular (i.e. satisfy R1-R3), (a) the e¤ect of toughness on terrorism is the sum of the provocation and deterrence e¤ects: E = P E + DE; (b) the two sube¤ects are opposed, that is: P E 0 if individual preferences satisfy NIP; DE 0 if individual preferences satisfy TC and policies satisfy MP.
This theorem (proved in Appendix B) con…rms Section 2's analysis of a trade-o¤ between deterrence and provocation, this time from a marginal toughness angle, i.e. from a comparative statics angle. Indeed, under Theorem 1's 14 That is, the punishment function f t : X t ! R + is di¤erentiable. 15 That is, t < t 0 implies that f
conditions the two sube¤ects pull in opposite directions, and whether a marginal toughness rise increases terrorism by the person depends on which of P E and DE dominates. Arguably, this comparison is what policy makers should mainly focus on in practice.
Of course, Theorem 1 implies an analogous decomposition at the aggregate level: E = PE + DE, with E, PE, and PE de…ned as the sum-total of the individual e¤ects E; P E and DE across the population, respectively.
The social utility of toughness
So far I have been largely informal about the policy maker's preferences, occasionally assuming that he minimises sum-total terrorism or sum-total terrorism plus policy costs. More generally, assume now he holds some arbitrary preference order over the set R N + T of damages-policy combinations ((x i ) i2N ; t), and let this preference be representable by a 'social utility'function U :
There are numerous examples. Social utility may be de…ned by U ((x i ) i2N ; t) = X i2N x i if the policy maker minimises sum-total terrorism, or by U ((x i ) i2N ; t) = #fi 2 N : x i = 0g if he minimises the number of terrorists (individuals with positive damage). A more general speci…cation is U ((x i ) i2N ; t) = X i2N x i (with a …xed parameter > 0), which reduces to the …rst example if a = 1 and to the second one if ! 0. Another natural class of utility functions are the Cobb-Douglas forms U ((x i ) i2N ; t) = i2N x i (for some parameter > 0). Each of these speci…cations can be re…ned by subtracting a (suitably scaled) cost term Cost(t) that captures …nancial costs or other negative policy e¤ects such as loss of (civilian or military) lives or loss of life quality through more state supervision; this gives for instance the utility speci…cation
Note that by subtracting a cost term we assume that policy costs are additively separable from the damage disutility. A speci…cation without additive separability is U ((x i ) i2N ; t) = t i2N x i (for …xed parameters ; > 0), assuming here that t is a toughness level taken from a policy interval T (0; 1) and that toughness is costly (i.e. > 0).
We now proceed to a comparative statics analysis that makes the following assumptions. As in the last two subsections, we consider the unidimensional policy choice problem UP, and assume that individual preferences on the damage-punishment quadrant R 2 + are regular (i.e. satisfy R1-R3), so that each individual i has to any toughness level t 2 T a unique optimal damage response x i (t), which is di¤erentiable in t. Further, let the utility function U be di¤er-entiable. Then the marginal value of toughness t can be captured by the total derivative dU=dt (evaluated at the status quo t). 
Three competing forces thus act on the marginal utility of toughness: dU dt is increased by an aggregate deterrence term, but decreased both by an aggregate provocation term and the cost e¤ect. Whether a toughness increase is desirable depends on whether the deterrence term overweighs the two other terms.
Suppose further the policy maker does not care about who creates damage, in the sense that U ((x i ) i2N ; t) = U ((x 0 i ) i2N ; t) whenever the damage pro…les is strictly negative) happens exactly when
i.e. when the two competing e¤ects, DE and PE, are overall 'su¢ ciently negative'. By contrast, a provocation-neglecting policy maker (who believes that preferences are policy-invariant, hence that PE = 0) raises toughness already if
hence more easily because PE 0. The criteria (5) and (6) illustrate the behavioural di¤erence between accounting for and neglecting provocation: in his decision over whether to raise toughness, the provocation-aware policy maker is guided by the more restrictive criterion (5), hence raises toughness less easily and reduces toughness more easily. The equilibrium toughness level (at which the policy maker neither raise nor reduces toughness) is lower for the provocation-aware policy maker, because his …rst-order condition
is typically satis…ed at a lower status quo toughness than the provocationneglecting policy maker's …rst-order condition
The di¤erent equilibrium conditions (7) and (8) again illustrate the di¤er-ent toughness dispositions underlying provocation-aware and -neglecting policy making.
Concluding remarks
First, let me summarise some issues that have been developed. A policy maker may try to reduce terrorism either by cause-related measures, which aim to appease people's preferences, or by symptom-related measures, which change the constraints (feasible set) under which terrorists operate and which, importantly, may have side e¤ects on some people's preferences ('provocation'). While both approaches are costly, a fundamental di¤erence lies in the bene…t side: cause-related measures reduce terrorism (the only question being: by how much?), whereas symptom-related measures may or may not reduce terrorism, depending on whether the deterrence e¤ect overweighs the provocation e¤ect. This does not imply that symptom-related measures are generally inferior, but that they bear a higher downside-risk: the worst outcome of a cause-related measure is to incur the policy cost without terrorism reduction, but the worst outcome of a symptom-related measure (e.g. a war) is to incur the policy cost with a terrorism increase. Most of the paper has focussed on analysing symptom-related policies, and speci…cally the trade-o¤ between deterrence and provocation. Theorem 1 provides general su¢ cient conditions under which the marginal deterrence e¤ect is non-positive (i.e. terrorism-reducing) and the marginal provocation e¤ect is non-negative (i.e. terrorism-increasing). I have argued that it is easy in practice to overlook provocation e¤ects (Section 2.5). Provocation-neglect leads to toughness exaggeration (the fallacy of neglecting provocation), as argued informally in Section 2.5 and shown formally in Section 3.4 by comparing the (…rst-order) conditions under which a provocation-aware and a provocation-neglecting policy maker chooses how tough to be. As an analytic example, Theorem 2 in Appendix A characterises optimal policies for a stylised objective function (minimising the number of terrorists), again con…rming that there is a trade-o¤ between deterring and provoking, and that provocation-neglect leads to toughness exaggeration.
Our analysis poses several empirical and theoretical challenges. On the empirical side, it would be of high practical interest to know the extent to which concrete cause-related policies (investments into social stability, into education etc.) appease preferences, 16 and the extent to which concrete symptom-related policies (weapons embargoes, military presence, criminal legislation etc.) brutalise preferences, i.e. provoke. Among di¤erent ways to deter (i.e. to render the feasible set F R 2 + 'steeper'), which ones provoke least? Are there policies that deter without provoking? A concrete hypothesis to investigate is whether defensive deterrence provokes less than aggressive deterrence. As mentioned in Section 2.2, I count a deterrence measure as defensive if it makes it harder to create terrorism (e.g. weapons embargoes) and as aggressive if it increases punishment (e.g. tough criminal legislation). 17 To provide answers to such 16 This question relates to existing empirical research apart from the di¤erence between appeasing preferences and reducing terrorism. 17 Both kinds of deterrence can be de…ned formally and do indeed constitute deterrence, i.e. render the feasible set F R 2 + 'steeper'. Let A be a policy-independent set of possible (modes of) behaviour, and let x(a; t) 2 R + resp. y(a; t) 2 R + be the damage resp. punishment resulting from behaviour a 2 A at policy t 2 T . So policy t 2 T leads to the feasible set F t = f(x(a; t); y(a; t)) : a 2 Ag R 2 + . Say that one policy does more defensive (resp. aggressive) deterrence than another if it implies lower damage x(a; t) (resp. higher punishment questions, it would help to understand the psychological phenomenon of provocation: when is it a form of reciprocity, when one of taste acquisition, and when one of dynamic inconsistency (see Section 2.4)?
On a theoretical dimension, there is plenty of room for adapting our model to concrete applications, or for 'merging' it with models studied in political economy (that is, incorporating provocation into these models), or for re…n-ing the strategic interaction between individuals and the policy maker. For instance, one might introduce uncertainty of the policy maker about the types of population members, i.e., about how brutal and how provocable their preferences are. Or, one might model a repeated interaction between policy maker and population, with the question arising as to whether toughness can provoke only in the short run or can have lasting provocation e¤ects on the population.
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A An example: minimising the number of terrorists
Unlike in much of this paper, policies may now contain both cause-and symptomrelated measures; they might be represented as vectors t = (t 1 ; :::; t k ) of positions on k cause-or symptom-related dimensions. While I have so far ensured high generality of preferences by placing no speci…c restrictions (except from plausible ones such as punishment-aversion of individuals and terrorism-aversion of the policy maker), let us now turn to concrete preferences. I take the policy maker to follow a paradigmatic and simple objective -minimising the number of terrorists -and the individuals to hold preferences from a plausible but special class. This will allow us to analytically determine optimal policies. The upshot will be that optimal policies again have to strike the right compromise between provocation and deterrence, albeit in a particular sense.
Speci…cally, individual preferences fall into the following class.
Preference Model PM. Each individual in the population N is of one of the following types.
Either he has a peaceful type, meaning that under each policy t 2 T his preference order t (on R 2 + ) is peaceful as de…ned Section 2.1. (The set of peaceful types can be de…ned as the set of families ( t ) t2T of peaceful preference orders.)
Or his type belongs to the set R of possibly brutal types. Each possibly brutal type in R ( represents the status quo damage-inclination) holds under every policy t 2 T a preference order t = t; that is punishment-averse (see Section 2.1), strictly convex 18 , and representable by a utility function u t : R 2 + ! R of the (separable) form
with the following interpretation and properties: d(y) represents disutility from punishment, where the function d : R + ! R is policy-independent (a plausible restriction) and di¤erentiable. v t (x) represents utility of damage and takes the form v t (x) = v(x P (t)), where:
-v : R ! R is a di¤erentiable and strictly concave function that peaks at 0; hence v t (x) peaks at x = + P (t), and so the type has a brutal preference with preferred damage level + P (t) under policies t with + P (t) > 0, and peaceful preferences under policies t with + P (t) 0. -P (t) 2 R is interpreted as the amount by which policy t provokes 19 , i.e. increases the preferred damage level from the status quo t, and accordingly I assume without loss of generality that P ( t) = 0; 20 -is interpreted as the status quo damage-inclination, as it is the status quo preferred damage level (by P ( t) = 0) provided 0. v, d and P (t) are the same across types 2 R (this is the main restriction, essential for analytic tractability). There is no policy t 2 T at which all types 2 R most prefer the nodamage-no-punishment pair (x; y) = (0; 0) from F t (this excludes trivial 18 That is, for every (x; y) 2 R 2 + the upper contour set f(x 0 ; y 0 ) 2 R 2 + : (x 0 ; y 0 ) t (x; y)g is strictly convex. It follows that u t is quasi-concave (Th. A1.14 in Geo¤rey Jehle and Philip Reny 2001 ; to be precise, this theorem uses a slightly stronger notion of strictly convex preferences, which is implied by ours given that we also assume t to be continuous and punishment-averse). 19 The more general term "a¤ects preference" is perhaps better here than "provokes", as t could contain cause-related measures (aimed at preference appeasement, i.e. at P (t) < 0).
20 One may always achieve P ( t) = 0 by subtracting P ( t) from each P (t), t 2 T , while adding P ( t) to each individual's type 2 R; this normalisation leaves individual preferences unchanged.
solutions to the problem of minimising the number of terrorists).
PM is a ‡exible model: the precise forms of v; d; P; T can be chosen to match the intended application. As as simple example, let the policy space be unidimensional, say the interval T = R + of toughness levels, let disutility of punishment be linear, i.e. given by d(y) = by for a …xed parameter b > 0, let provocation be also linear, i.e. given by P (t) = (t t)p for a …xed parameter p > 0 (recall that P (t) represents the change of preferred damage level if toughness changes from the status quo level t to t), and let the function v be given by v(x) := jxj a for a …xed parameter a > 2. In summary, then, under toughness t 2 R + type 2 R has the (quasi-linear) utility function
with preferred damage level given by + (t t)p (or by 0 if this number is < 0).
While the policy space T is arbitrary (perhaps multi-dimensional with causeand symptom-related dimensions), a convexity property is required:
Convex Punishment CP. For each policy t 2 T , the feasible set F t contains the no-damage-no-punishment pair (0; 0), it is (topologically) closed and connected, and its punishment function f t : X t ! R + is weakly convex.
Recall that f t (x) represents the minimal punishment for damage x 2 X t ; the graph of f t is the southern border of the feasible set F t . By CP, this southern border has a weakly convex shape, for instance a linear shape given by f t (x) = t x for some policy-dependent slope t 0. In general, as F t is connected and contains (0; 0), the feasible damage set X t R + is an interval containing 0, hence is either R + (unlimited feasibility) or of the form [0; x t ] or [0; x t ) (with a …nite feasibility bound x t ).
Theorem 2 Assuming the preference model PM and convex punishment CP, )) is for each policy t 2 T well-de…ned, i.e. the (right hand) derivative f 0 t (0) exists and d 0 (0)f 0 t (0) has a unique inverse image under the derivative function v 0 : R ! R; (b) (provocation-aware policies) each policy t 2 T that minimises P (t) + D(t) minimises the number of terrorists if each individual's response to each policy t 2 T maximises his preference within the feasible set F t ; (c) (provocation-neglecting policies) each policy t 2 T that minimises D(t) minimises the number of terrorists if each individual's response to each policy t 2 T maximises his status quo preference within the feasible set F t ;
(d) the individual responses assumed in (b) and (c) exist and are unique.
Taking the example given after the de…nition of PM and assuming each toughness level t 2 T = R + leads to the (maximal) feasible damage set X t = R + and to a linear punishment function given by f t (x) = tx (which becomes 'steeper'if toughness t increases), one …nds that D(t) = (tb=a) 1=(a 1) , and by minimising P (t) + D(t) = (t t)p (tb=a) 1=(a 1) one …nds the optimal toughness level: t = (b=a)
1= (a 2) (p(a 1)) (a 1)=(a 2)
(as derived at the end of Appendix B). So optimal toughness increases if marginal provocation p = P 0 (t) falls (i.e. if toughness provokes less), and also if marginal punishment aversion b = d 0 (y) increases (i.e. if punishment hurts more, hence deters more). These comparative statics con…rm our intuition.
Theorem 2 once again con…rms the trade-o¤ between provocation and deterrence: P (t) is a measure for how much the policy t provokes, and D(t) is an (inverse) measure for how much t deters. D(t) measures deterrence in that it re ‡ects the punishment function f t but not any policy-induced preference change. D(t) measures deterrence inversely: the more deterring t, the 'steeper' the feasible set F t , hence the higher the derivative f Figure 10 illustrates the (one-dimensional) case that t is a toughness level from a toughness interval T R. Plausibly, the higher toughness t, the larger P (t) (more provocation) and the smaller D(t) (more deterrence), the goal being to minimise the sum P (t)+D(t). If T is multidimensional, the trade-o¤ becomes multi-dimensional, possibly with cause-related dimensions. 21 v 0 : R ! R is a strictly decreasing function, so has strictly decreasing inverse function
By contrast, the provocation-neglecting policy maker believes that P (t) = 0 (no provocation) for all (arbitrarily tough) policies t 2 T , hence what he minimises is not P (t) + D(t) but D(t), leading to toughness exaggeration.
Perhaps surprisingly, the optimal policies in Theorem 2 do not depend on the distribution of types across the population: minimising P (t) + D(t) is optimal regardless of how many individuals are highly damage-inclined (large 2 R). So the policy maker can set its policy without 'understanding'people. This interesting feature of the model (with its stylised notion of optimality: minimising the number of terrorists) is certainly an exception. In other models, optimal policies are type-distribution-sensitive and often analytically intractable.
Finally, the provocation and deterrence measures P (t) and D(t) di¤er from the earlier-studied provocation and deterrence e¤ects PE(t) and DE(t) because they arise in the context of minimising the number of terrorists, not the sumtotal amount of terrorism as earlier.
B Proof of Theorems 1 and 2
Proof of Theorem 1. Suppose UP and R1-R3.
(a) By x(t) = x(t; t), the function t 7 ! x(t) is the composition of the differentiable functions t 7 ! (t; t) (from T to T T ) and the by R3 di¤erentiable function (t 1 ; t 2 ) 7 ! x(t 1 ; t 2 ) (from T T to R + ). Hence, by the chain rule, t 7 ! x(t) is itself di¤erentiable and
Setting t = t, the left-hand side becomes E, and the right-hand side is recognised as the sum of P E and DE; for instance,
(b) Throughout, I write ( x; y) for the pair (x( t; t); y( t; t)) (= (x prov ( t); y prov ( t)) = (x deter ( t); y deter ( t))).
1. In this part I assume NIP and show that P E 0. Suppose for a contradiction that P E < 0. I establish several claims; the last one contains the desired contradiction. Claim 1. There exists a toughness levelt 2 T larger than t such that x prov (t) < x for all t 2 ( t;t]. I writex := x prov (t) andỹ := y prov (t).
As P E = lim t! t xprov (t) xprov ( t) t t = lim t! t xprov (t) x t t and as P E < 0, we have xprov (t) x t t < 0 for all t 6 = t in a su¢ ciently small neighbourhood of t. In particular, there is at > t such that for all t 2 ( t;t] we have x prov (t) x < 0, i.e. x prov (t) < x, q.e.d. 
with the usual conventions that sup ; := 1 and that sup Q := 1 whenever Q R has no upper bound.
By de…nition of S(x) we have S(x)
ỹ, and using punishment-aversion it follows that S(x) =ỹ, q.e.d.
Consider any x 2 [x; x] with S(x) 2 R + . To show that u t (x; S(x)) u t (x;ỹ), note that by de…nition of S(x) there is a sequence (y k ) k=1;2;::: in [0; S(s)] converging to S(x) such that u t (x; y k ) u t (x;ỹ) for all k = 1; 2; ::: As u t is a continuous function, u t (x; y k ) ! u t (x; S(x)) as k ! 1. So, as weak inequalities are preserved in the limit, u t (x; S(x)) u t (x;ỹ). To show the converse inequality, consider any sequence (z k ) k=1;2;::: in (S(x); 1) converging to S(x) (of course there is one). By de…nition of S(x), we have u t (x; z k ) < u t (x;ỹ) for all k = 1; 2; ::: So, again by continuity of u t , u t (x; S(x)) u t (x;ỹ), q.e.d.
For a contradiction, suppose S( x) 6 = 1. We also have S( x) 6 = 1 because u t ( x; y) u t (x;ỹ) (as ( x; y) maximises u t (x; y) subject to (x; y) 2 F t ). So S( x) 2 R + . Hence, by Claim 4, (*) u t ( x; S( x)) = u t (x;ỹ).
This and the inequality u t ( x; y) > u t (x;ỹ) (which holds because ( x; y) uniquely maximises u t (x; y) subject to (x; y) 2 F t ) imply that u t ( x; y) > u t ( x; S( x)), which by punishment-aversion entails that (**) y < S( x).
But (*) also implies that ut(x;ỹ) ut( x; S( x)) by NIP. Using (**) and punishment-aversion, it follows that ut(x;ỹ) < ut( x; y), a contradiction since (x;ỹ) maximises ut(x; y) subject to (x; y) 2 F t , q.e.d. Claim 6. There exists an x 2 [x; x] that is smallest subject to S(x) = 1. I denote it by x 1 . I have to show that the set X 1 := fx 2 [x; x] : S(x) = 1g has a smallest element. By Claim 5, X 1 is non-empty. So it has an in…mum x := inf X 1 in [x; x]. I have to show that S(x ) = 1 (i.e. that the in…mum is a minimum). By de…nition of x , there is a sequence (x k ) k=1;2;::: in X 1 that converges to x . Consider any y 0. As u t is a continuous function, u t (x k ; y) ! u t (x ; y) as k ! 1. Note also that, for all k, u t (x k ; y) u t (x;ỹ): otherwise u t (x k ; y 0 ) < u t (x;ỹ) for all y 0 > y by punishment-aversion, implying that S(x k ) y, in contradiction with x k 2 X 1 . So, as weak inequalities are preserved in the limit, we have u t (x ; y) u t (x;ỹ). Since this has been shown for all y 0, we have S(x ) = 1, q.e.d.
By Claim 3, S(x) =ỹ. So S(x) < 1. Hence x 1 6 =x by Claim 6, q.e.d.
Consider any sequence (x k ) k=1;2;::: in [x; x 1 ) such that x k " x 1 . I have to show that S(x k ) ! 1. For a contradiction, suppose that S(x k ) 6 ! 1. Then there is aŷ > 0 and a subsequence (x k j ) j=1;2;::: -I denote it simply by (x 0 j ) j=1;2;::: -such that S(x 0 j ) <ŷ for all j. So, by de…nition of S(x 0 j ), we have u t (x 0 j ;ŷ) < u t (x;ỹ) for all j. Hence, as u t (x 0 j ;ŷ) ! u t (x 1 ;ŷ) by continuity of u t and as weak inequalities are preserved in the limit, we have u t (x 1 ;ŷ) u t (x;ỹ). Hence, by punishment-aversion, we have u t (x 1 ; y) < u t (x;ỹ) for all y >ŷ. So S(x 1 ) ŷ, a contradiction since S(x 1 ) = 1 by Claim 6, q.e.d.
Claim 9. For all y 0, we have ut(x 1 ; y) ut(x;ỹ).
Let y
0. By Claim 8 there is an x 0 2 [x; x 1 ) such that S(x) y for all x 2 (x 0 ; x 1 ). For any x 2 (x 0 ; x 1 ), we have ut(x; y) ut(x; S(x)) by punishment-aversion, and ut(x; S(x)) ut(x;ỹ) by NIP and the fact that u t (x; S(x)) = u t (x;ỹ) given Claim 4.
So ut(x; y) ut(x;ỹ) for all x 2 (x 0 ; x 1 ). Hence, as ut is continuous, ut(x 1 ; y) ut(x;ỹ), q.e.d.
Claim 10. (x;ỹ) does not maximise ut(x; y) subject to (x; y) 2 F t (a contradiction, completing the proof).
By Claim 2 there is a toughness level t 2 [ t;t] such that x prov (t) = x 1 . Write y 1 := y prov (t). I now apply Claim 9 to y 1 + 1, which gives us ut(x 1 ; y 1 + 1) ut(x;ỹ). So, ut(x 1 ; y 1 ) > ut(x;ỹ) by punishment-aversion. As (x 1 ; y 1 ) = (x prov (t); y prov (t)) 2 F t , it follows that (x;ỹ) does not maximise ut(x; y) subject to (x; y) 2 F t , q.e.d.
2. I now assume TC and MP, and show that DE 0. Suppose that DE > 0. I derive a contradiction, again in several steps.
is a weakly increasing function of x 2 Xt. Hence, asx > x, we have ft(x) f t (x) ft( x) f t ( x), or by reordering,
Let t 2 T . As F t is by CP connected and contains (0; 0), X t is an interval containing 0. X t is non-singleton: otherwise F t = f(0; 0)g, so that (0; 0) would be each type's best response to policy t, a trivial case excluded in PM. Now let x; x 0 2 X t nf0g with x < x 0 . The x can be written as x 0 for some 0 < < 1.
Claim 2. For every policy t 2 T , the function f t : X t ! R + is increasing, continuous, and di¤erentiable (from the right) at x = 0 with f 0 t (0) 0. Let t 2 T . The function f t is increasing on X t nf0g by Claim 1, hence increasing on its full domain as f t (0) = 0 by (0; 0) 2 F t . As x # 0, the ratio
=x is decreasing (by Claim 1) and bounded below by 0, hence has a limit f 0 (0) that is moreover 0. It remains to show continuity. Since f t is convex, it is continuous on every open subinterval I X t (as the reader can easily check); so the only potential discontinuities arise at the boundaries of X t . Continuity at the left boundary 0 holds by di¤erentiability. Now suppose X t contains a right boundary, i.e. takes the form X t = [0; x ]. and consider an increasing sequence (x k ) k=1;2;::: in X t with x k " x . As f t is increasing, the sequence (f t (x k )) k=1;2;::: is increasing and bounded (by f t (x )), hence converges to a value y. So (x k ; f t (x k )) k=1;2;::: is a sequence in F t that converges to (a ; y). So, as F t is topologically closed, we have (a ; y) 2 F t , hence f (a ) = y, q.e.d. This follows easily from punishment-aversion, q.e.d.
Claim 4. For every policy t 2 T , if X t = [0; a ) for some a := a t 2 R + , then f t (x) ! 1 as x " a , and for every type there exists an = 2 (0; a ) such that (x; f t (x)) t; (0; 0) for all x 2 (a ; a ).
Let t 2 T and X t = [0; a ) with a 2 R + .
First, if we had f t (x) 6 ! 1 as x " a , there would exist a sequence (x k ) k=1;2;::: in X t with x k ! a such that the sequence (x k ; f t (x k )) k=1;2;::: is bounded in R 2 + ; now taking any convergent subsequence of it (there is one; see Th. A1.8 in Geoffrey Jehle and Philip Reny 2001), we would have a sequence in F t that converges to some point (a ; y) outside F t , a contradiction since F t is topologically closed.
Second, consider any type . The claim is obvious if is a peaceful type. Now suppose 2 R and for a contradiction let no > 0 have the required property. Then there exists a sequence (x k ) k=1;2;::: in X t such that x k ! a and (x k ; f t (x k )) t; (0; 0) for all k = 1; 2; ::: By f t (x k ) ! 1 and x k ! a , we have in case 1, on the compact subinterval [0; + P (t)] the function u t; (x; f t (x)) of x admits a maximumx 2 [0; + P (t)]. I show thatx is a global maximum of u t; (x; f t (x)), which completes the proof as it establishes that (x; f t (x)) is an optimal within F t . To do so, consider any x 2 R + larger than + P (t). Recall that u t; (x; f t (x)) = v(x P (t)) d(f t (x)).
So, as v(x P (t)) v(0) (because v peaks at 0) and d(f t (x)) d(f t ( +P (t))) (because f t and d are increasing functions by Claims 2 and 3), u t; (x; f t (x)) v(0) d(f t ( + P (t))) = u t; ( + P (t)); f t ( + P (t))), which is at most u t; (x; f t (x)) by the restricted maximality property ofx. This shows the global maximality property ofx, q.e.d. This holds because v is strictly concave and peaks at x = 0.
Claim 7. The range v 0 (R) of v 0 is an interval containing 0.
By the previous claim, 0 = v 0 (0) 2 v 0 (R). To prove that v 0 (R) is an interval (which if v 0 is continuous follows easily from the intermediate value theorem), it su¢ ces to show that, for all x 1 ; x 2 2 v 0 (R) with x 1 < x 2 and all s between v 0 (x 1 ) and v 0 (x 2 ) there exists anx 2 [x 1 ; x 2 ] such that v 0 (x) = s. Consider such x 1 ; x 2 ; s. By the previous claim, v 0 (x 2 ) < v 0 (x 1 ), and hence v 0 (x 2 ) < s < v 0 (x 1 ). I distinguish two cases, and write k for the coe¢ cient Claim 8. For all t 2 T and all 2 R, (i) the function U t; (x) := u t; (x; f t (x)) of x 2 X t is di¤erentiable (from the right) at x = 0 with U 0 t; (0) = v 0 ( P (t)) d 0 (0)f 0 t (0), and (ii) x t > 0 , U 0 t; (0) > 0 , v 0 ( P (t)) > d 0 (0)f 0 t (0). Let t 2 T and 2 R. Note that U t; (x) = v(x P (t)) d(f t (x))) for all x 2 X t . As f t is di¤erentiable (from the right) at x = 0 by Claim 1, and as the functions v and d are di¤erentiable, the chain rule implies that U t; (x) is di¤erentiable (from the right) at x = 0 with derivative given by
In (ii), the second equivalence is obvious by (i). Regarding the …rst equivalence, if U 0 t; (0) > 0 then, for some x 2 X t , we have U t; (0) < U t; (x), implying that (0; 0) = (0; f t (0)) t; (x; f t (x)), hence that (0; 0) is not optimal, and so x t; > 0. Conversely, suppose now that x t > 0. To show U 0 t; (0) > 0, I consider two cases.
Case 1 : d 0 (0) = 0. Then U 0 (0) = v 0 ( P (t)), which is positive because P (t) < 0 (by x t > 0 and Claim 5) and because v 0 is positive on ( 1; 0) (by Claim 7).
Case 2 : d 0 (0) > 0. Since (x t ; f t (x t )) = (x t ; y t ) is the unique optimal response to t (by Claim 5), we have (x t ; y t ) t; (0; f t (0)) = (0; 0). So, as the preference t; is continuity, there exists an > 0 such that (x t ; y t + ) t; (0; 0). Hence, as t; is strictly convex, any strict convex combination of (x t ; y t + ) and (0; 0) is also strictly preferred to (0; 0). That is, ( x t ; (y t + )) t; (0; 0) for all 2 (0; 1); or equivalently, (x; x y t + x t ) t; (0; 0) for all x 2 (0; x t ). So the function V : X t ! R de…ned by V (x) = u t; x; x y t + x t satis…es V (x) V (0) whenever x < x t . As V is given by V (x) = v(x P (t)) d x y t + x t and as v and d are di¤erentiable, the chain rule implies that V is di¤erentiable with derivative given by
As V (x) V (0) whenever x < x t , we have 0 V 0 (0), i.e.
where the latter inequality holds by d 0 (0) > 0. In the last expression,
by Claims 1 and 2. This inequality and (9) imply that 0 < v 0 ( P (t)) d 0 (0)f 0 t (0), i.e. that 0 < U 0 (0), q.e.d. Let t 2 T . Uniqueness of the inverse image holds because v 0 is a strictly decreasing (by Claim 6) and hence one-to-one. To show existence, I have to show that d 0 (0)f 0 t (0) is in the range v 0 (R). By PM, there exists a type 2 R for whom (x; y) = (0; 0) is not an optimal response to t; so the optimum (x t ; f t (x t )) satis…es x t > 0. Hence, by Claim 8, Claim 10. For all policies t 2 T , a type 2 R has x t > 0 (i.e. is a terrorist) if and only > (P (t) + D(t)).
Let t 2 T and 2 R. We have x t > 0 if and only if v 0 ( P (t)) > d 0 (0)f 0 t (0). The function v 0 : R ! R is by Claim 6 strictly decreasing, hence is invertible with strictly decreasing inverse function v 0 1 , whose domain v(R) contains both sides of the last inequality by Claim 9. So, applying v 0 1 on both sides of the inequality yields the equivalent inequality P (t) < v 0 1 (d 0 (0)f 0 t (0)) (= D(t)), which in turn is equivalent to > (P (t) + D(t)).
Derivations for the example after Theorem 2. All functions in the example satisfy the required di¤erentiability or convexity conditions. At all x 0 we have v 0 (x) = ( ( x) a ) 0 = a( x) a 1 . So the inverse v 0 : R ! R is at all z 0 given by v 0 1 (z) = (z=a) 1=(a 1) . Hence D(t) = v 0 1 (d 0 (0)f 0 t (0)) = v 0 1 (bt) = (bt=a) 1=(a 1) . To minimise P (t) + D(t), note that at all t > 0 this function is di¤erentiable with derivative (p(a 1)) (a 1)=(a 2) .
This only stationary point of P (t) + D(t) is indeed a (global) minimum, since the above expression for [P (t) + D(t)] is strictly increasing in t > 0 (using that a > 2).
